Social benefits in Uruguay: why do some potential beneficiaries not apply? by Melo, Gioia de & Burdín, Gabriel
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 8  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 9
141
Social benefits in Uruguay:
why do some potential 
beneficiaries not apply?
Gabriel Burdín and Gioia de Melo
C ash transfer programmes have become very important in Latin 
America. Concerns about proper targeting have centred on excluding 
people who do not meet eligibility requirements. Less attention has been 
paid to the failure of programmes to reach the whole of their target 
population, partly because there are people who do not even apply. The 
present article analyses the determinants of non-take-up of social benefits. 
The case studied is the National Social Emergency Plan, an income 
transfer programme implemented in Uruguay between 2005 and 2007. It 
is calculated that over a fifth of eligible households have never enrolled 
in the programme. A probit model is used to estimate the determinants 
of the decision to apply. The evidence obtained is highly consistent with 
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Why might households that meet the eligibility 
requirements for particular social benefits not apply 
for them? This unresponsiveness on the part of 
potential beneficiaries is what social programme 
evaluation studies have called the “non-take-up” 
problem. The purpose of the present document is to 
offer some preliminary explanations, with reference 
to the National Social Emergency Plan (Plan de 
Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social—panes) 
implemented in Uruguay.
Hernanz, Malherbert and Pellizzari (2004) argue 
that there are at least three reasons for studying non-
take-up of social benefits. First, a social programme 
that reaches only a part of its target population is bound 
to be less effective than originally intended. Second, 
better knowledge of the main factors influencing the 
decision to apply allows a more accurate estimate to be 
formed of the fiscal consequences of changing policies, 
and means they can be better designed. Third, if  the 
decision not to apply for a benefit is partially involuntary 
(being due to poor information, administrative problems 
or stigmatizing procedures, for instance), there will 
be disparities in the treatment of individuals, even 
though the social protection system ought to be the 
same for everyone. In other words, some people will 
have difficulty exercising certain social rights.
Most of the studies available on non-take-up have 
been conducted in the countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(oecd), particularly the United Kingdom and the 
United States, which have a longer tradition of 
targeted social programmes.1 However, the issue has 
become increasingly important in the countries of 
Latin America as numerous selective cash transfer 
programmes have been implemented there.2 Beneficiaries 
1 Most research into non-take-up has been done in the United 
Kingdom (Atkinson, 1989; Craig, 1991; Corden, 1995; Currie, 
2004, among others) and the United States (Ashenfelter, 1983; 
Moffitt, 1983; Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Anderson and Meyer, 1997; 
Bollinger and David, 2001), although the issue has gained greater 
prominence in European countries over the past decade.
2 Mention may be made of those applied in Mexico (Progresa-
Oportunidades), Colombia (Families in Action), Honduras (Family 
Allowance Programme), Nicaragua (Social Protection Network), 
Bolivia (Beca Futuro), Ecuador (Human Development Bond), 
Chile (Unitary Family Subsidy) and Brazil (Programme for the 
Eradication of Child Labour (peti), Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Familia). 
are selected using mechanisms based on households’ 
resources and socio-economic situation (proxy means 
tests) that inevitably lead to targeting errors (Cornia 
and Stewart, 1995). These can be of two types: the 
inclusion of people who are not part of the target 
population, and the non-inclusion of  people who 
do meet programme eligibility conditions. As Coady, 
Grosh and Hoddinott (2004) point out, the emphasis 
has been on minimizing the former by improving the 
statistical formulas used to identify participants who 
do not meet the relevant requirements, but the scale of 
the latter has been underestimated, which in practice 
means that a segment of the most vulnerable population 
is being denied access to social benefits.
This being so, new evidence on the factors 
determining take-up decisions could be helpful in 
clarifying certain problematic aspects of the design 
of targeted social programmes. This is particularly 
important for Uruguay, as the issue has not been 
addressed in other studies. Nor has it been much 
considered in the social programme evaluations 
conducted in the region. Another reason for improving 
our understanding of this phenomenon is that the 
targeting instrument employed in panes has been 
used (with some modifications) in other recently 
implemented programmes such as the new legal regime 
of family allowances, the Objetivo Empleo initiative 
and the elderly assistance law.
Lastly, we believe that an explanatory model 
of households’ or individuals’ decisions to apply to 
social programmes may be an important resource 
for ex ante policy evaluation studies based on 
microsimulations. The purpose of studies of this type, 
of which increasing use is being made in Uruguay and 
elsewhere in the region, is to analyse the scale and sign 
of the consequences of different policy alternatives for 
certain variables of interest (usually indigence, poverty 
and income distribution) prior to implementation. 
One limitation, however, is that they usually assume 
These programmes usually have a twofold objective: first, to support 
incomes in situations of  extreme deprivation, and second, to 
promote the accumulation of human capital, particularly among 
households’ younger members, by stipulating conditions relating 
to nutrition, medical check-ups and school attendance in return 
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programmes are perfectly targeted, which can mean 
the effects of policies being measured inappropriately. 
Knowledge of household decision-making may allow 
results to be calibrated more accurately.
The present study estimates a probit model for 
take-up of the National Social Emergency Plan, with a 
view to identifying the main factors behind this decision. 
In specifying the model, it seeks to capture the most 
important causes identified in theoretical and empirical 
studies: monetary factors, information costs and social 
and psychological costs. The data used come from the 
2006 Extended National Household Survey (enha) 
and the 2007 Continuous Household Survey.
The document is organized as follows. Following 
this introduction, section II gives a more precise 
definition of the research problem to be addressed. 
Section III discusses theoretical studies on the 
determinants of  the decision to apply to social 
programmes and reviews the empirical research 
background. Section IV specifies the model of analysis 
and section V summarizes the characteristics of panes. 
Section VI details the information sources used, 
identifies the relative size of the group of households 
concerned and presents descriptive statistics. Section 
VII describes the results of the estimates and section 
VIII contains some concluding remarks.
II
Definition of the research problem
Van Oorschot (1996) identified three possible 
approaches to analysing the problem of non-take-
up of social benefits. This typology can be used to 
establish the object of study of the present document 
with greater precision.
(a) Primary or secondary non-take-up. Primary 
non-take up means that eligible persons do not 
apply for the benefit concerned, while secondary 
non-take-up occurs when eligible individuals 
who do so apply are rejected by the programme 
administrators.
(b) Partial or total non-take-up. Partial non-take-up is 
where a person applies for a particular benefit but 
receives only part of it.3 This may happen because 
the applicant supplies inaccurate information or 
3 In Europe there are programmes whose benefits vary by the 
difference between household income and the poverty line. It 
is thus possible that, because of an administrative oversight or 
targeting error, an applicant accepted for one of them may receive 
an amount of money that does not match the sum required to bring 
the household up to the poverty line.
because of an evaluation error by the programme 
management.
(c) Permanent or temporary non-take-up. It is possible 
that eligible persons may require a certain period 
of time to become aware of the existence of the 
programme, decide they are eligible, apply for 
the benefit and finally receive it, and this gives 
rise to a situation of temporary non-take-up.
The present study centres on the determinants of 
primary and total non-take-up of social programmes. It 
does not address the problem of secondary non-take-up 
associated with errors or discretionary behaviour by 
programme managers when using targeting mechanisms 
to select beneficiaries.
Partial non-take-up does not seem to be relevant 
in the case of  panes, as this consists in a uniform 
cash transfer. Lastly, while we believe it is important 
to distinguish between permanent and temporary 
non-take-up, panel data showing the behaviour of 
eligible individuals over time would be needed to 
address the issue.
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The factors determining non-take-up of social benefits 
are usually modelled as a ratio between the benefits and 
costs of applying, with an emphasis on the size of the 
direct and indirect costs of enrolling in programmes 
of this type. These costs are usually substantial for 
households, as the process involves travelling to public 
offices, submitting the documentation required, filling 
in forms and making an income declaration, among 
other things. Thus, it is assumed that households 
will decide to come forward only if  the amount and 
duration of the benefit amply compensate them for 
the costs incurred, including non-monetary costs.
According to Fuchs (2007), the factors influencing 
take-up of social programmes can be classified into 
four major groups.
(a) Monetary factors. The larger the benefit in relation 
to the income of  the household, the greater 
will be the incentive to apply. If it varies by the 
characteristics of the applicant, the expectation 
is that the incentive to apply will depend on the 
amount each household calculates it will receive. 
People’s expectations about their future financial 
situation are an extremely important factor in the 
decision to enrol in social programmes. If people 
have little expectation of being able to escape from 
their situation of need by their own actions, the 
time period over which they expect to receive the 
benefit will be longer, justifying an application. 
However, there are financial costs involved in 
travelling, obtaining the necessary documents, etc., 
that people may assess when they are considering 
whether to apply to a programme.
(b) Information processing costs associated with social 
programmes and the complexity of application 
procedures. People may lack information to differing 
degrees, even to the extent of being unaware of 
the very existence of a particular benefit. The 
knowledge people have of the programme may 
affect how they rate their chances of receiving 
the benefits concerned, and their expectations of 
receiving it in relation to the cost of applying.
(c) Waiting costs associated with the duration of 
the application process and uncertainty about 
its outcome.
(d) Social and psychological costs. In Western countries, 
social norms hold that people ought to provide for 
themselves. Thus, applying for a social benefit may 
be seen as a departure from the rules of work and 
a sign of failure. Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull 
(1999) argue that the stigma involved in receiving 
a benefit could be defined as the punishment due 
for the breach of a social norm requiring people 
to support themselves by their own labour. As 
Elster (1989) points out, violations of  social 
norms trigger strong negative emotions in both 
the person violating them and others.
In small communities where contacts are more 
personalized and individuals’ actions thus easily 
observable, it is possible that fear of social sanctions 
may discourage people from applying to social 
programmes. Even in more impersonal contexts like 
large cities, however, the internalization of norms could 
generate a similar effect in individuals’ own minds. 
In other words, people will refrain from applying for 
a benefit if  they see this as a failure that affects their 
self-esteem (Moffitt, 1983; Atkinson, 1995; Sen, 1995). 
Again, individuals could decide not to apply for a 
benefit because of the loss of integrity that having 
to submit to an eligibility assessment would entail 
(Mood, 2005).
At the same time, social interactions and the effects 
of  people’s environment generally are particularly 
significant insofar as they affect information and 
stigma costs. Different studies have documented the 
importance of  social interaction, and peer group 
effects in particular, in situations of poverty. If  the 
constraints or sanctions associated with particular kinds 
of behaviour are reciprocal between individuals, the 
personal cost to each will depend on how widespread 
this behaviour is in the rest of the group (Durlauf, 
2002). This being so, the likelihood of a benefit being 
taken up may be affected by the number of recipients 
within the community to which the individual belongs 
(geographical area, ethnic group). If  take-up of the 
benefit is widespread, the stigma attached to applying 
for it is considerably reduced. It also means that 
information about the programme concerned will 
be spread through networks of  personal contacts, 
III
review of the theoretical
and empirical literature
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reducing the cost to individuals of  obtaining and 
processing this.4
Since there is no way of directly observing how 
households or individuals assess benefits and the costs 
associated with them, empirical analyses use proxies. 
We shall now describe the main variables used in the 
empirical studies available and the determinants to 
which they relate.
(a) Education level of  the household head. The 
expectation is that the more educated a household 
head is, the more easily he or she will be able 
to process information about the application 
procedure, and thus the lower the transaction costs 
will be. However, more highly educated people 
have greater future opportunities of increasing 
their income, and the shorter expected duration 
of a particular benefit will affect programme take-
up negatively. Education could therefore work 
both ways. Some authors have found a negative 
relationship between education levels and take-up 
(Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Riphahn, 2001), while 
others have found no significant relationship 
(Kayser and Frick, 2001; Terracol, 2002).
(b) Home ownership. As with education, people who 
own the homes they live in can look forward 
to higher potential incomes on average. The 
expectation is therefore that they will require 
assistance for shorter periods of time and will 
be less likely to apply for social benefits, given 
the costs this entails.
(c) Household type. A number of studies have shown 
that single-parent households, which are usually 
headed by women, are more likely to apply to 
social programmes. This could be because they 
have fewer opportunities to find a sufficiently 
well-paid job, as the one adult has to look after 
the children alone and thus needs short, flexible 
working hours, failing which child-care services 
will be required, with the high opportunity cost 
these entail. It has also been shown that female 
household heads tend to apply for social benefits 
more often than men. Riphahn (2001) argues that 
the level of social stigma depends on the age and 
sex of the household head. In other words, it is 
seen as more stigmatizing for a mature man to 
be unable to provide an adequate income for his 
household than for a woman.
4 When the factors are considered all together, it must be realized 
that transaction and stigma costs are greatest when the benefit 
is being applied for, so that potential beneficiaries who expect to 
receive it for only a short period of time might judge that the costs 
of applying exceed the benefits associated with it.
(d) Presence of  minors in the household. In much 
the same way, the presence of  children in the 
household usually makes people more likely to 
apply to social programmes, as this can mitigate 
feelings of guilt and stigma (Duclos, 1995).
(e) Ethnic origin. People belonging to ethnic minorities 
are expected to be more likely to apply for social 
benefits. For one thing, it is possible that their 
expectations of paid employment in the labour 
market may be low because of the discriminatory 
practices they face, reflected as they are in high 
specific unemployment rates and lower pay. For 
another, stigma costs could be lower because 
claimants represent a large proportion of the 
peer group.5
(f) Age. When a social programme is open to all age 
groups, young people are expected to have a higher 
participation rate then others. It is possible that 
older adults may face higher costs if the application 
process is relatively complex. Members of this 
group might also be more independent-minded 
and less willing to accept benefits that do not 
derive from their own labour.
(g) Geographical area. Another factor that could 
account for non-take-up of social programmes 
is the size of the community to which potential 
beneficiaries belong. There is likely to be more 
stigma in small communities where people 
receiving benefits find it harder to conceal this.
(h) Receipt of other benefits. If a particular household 
is already in receipt of some kind of transfer, it 
will be more likely to enrol in new programmes. 
Previous experience with similar application 
processes will reduce its information requirements 
and other associated costs. The stigma cost is also 
less significant for a household that is already in
 receipt of social benefits (Kayser and Frick, 2001).
(i) Percentage of  beneficiaries in the local area. 
According to Mood (2005), most of the determinants
 mentioned can be attributed in part to certain 
specific group norms. If large numbers of people 
are in receipt of social benefits, and if the members 
of a group identify and interact more with one 
another than with other individuals, willingness 
to apply ought to be high. One of the proxies 
most often used is the percentage of households 
receiving the benefit in the neighbourhood where 
5 Kayser and Frick (2001) argued that immigrants were less likely 
to apply for social benefits because they faced a higher level of 
stigma, as well as language barriers and lack of familiarity with 
the social protection system. All these factors are heightened when 
the household does not have a legal residence permit.
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they live. This has been established after thorough 
controls by Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan 
(2000) in the United States, Terracol (2002) in 
France and Mood (2004) in Sweden.
Regarding the method of estimation used, studies 
generally employ probit models (Riphahn, 2001; Kayser 
and Frick, 2001; Fuchs, 2007) or logit models (Mood, 
2005) to calculate the likelihood of eligible households 
applying for a particular social benefit.
Table 1 summarizes the main variables employed 
in the studies described, the determinants to which 
they relate and the sign of the estimate concerned.
IV
Model of analysis
Following Blundell, Fry and Walker (1988), we take a 
simplified model in which people evaluate the monetary 
and non-monetary costs and benefits of applying to 
the programme.
 U [ y + B(y,z*), z ] – C(y,z) > U(y,z) (1) 
 
where y represents the household’s original income 
and B = B(y,z*) the benefit to which the household is 
entitled on the basis of its income y and of z*, which 
represents the vector of  observable characteristics 
determining whether the benefit is granted.
Meanwhile, z represents the vector of characteristics 
determining the decision to apply and C(.) the costs 
of applying, also a function of y and z.
If  a linear specification is chosen for functions 
U and C, we get
 U [y + B(y,z*), z] = a0 + a1 (y+B) + a'2z+eT =UT (2a)
 U [ y,z ] = a0 + a1 y + a'2z+e0 =U0 (2b)
 –C ( y,z )  = b0 + b1 y + b'2z + μ (2c)
where eT, e0, and μ are the unobservable factors specific 
to each household.
Making the difference, and assuming linear 
specifications, between the right- and left-hand sides 
of equation (1) we get
 UT – C – U0 = b0 + a1B + b1y + b'2z + v   (3)
 where v  = eT  + μ – e0 
The probability of take-up is thus:
 P(UT –C –U0 >0)= P [v > – (b0 + a1B + b1y + b'2z)] (4)
In the case of the “ith” household, consequently, 
this probability can be expressed as the cumulative 
distribution function such that
 Pi = F (Bi , yi , zi) (5)
where the choice of F(.) depends on the assumption 
about the distribution of v among households.
It should be stressed that C is independent of B, 
which implies that there are fixed costs to applying 
(effort, stigma) that vary by household depending on 
the characteristics of z and income y. C(.) depends 
positively on y, as it is assumed that higher-income 
households will feel more stigmatized at applying for 
a means-tested programme. There will be a decreasing 
likelihood of take-up at y, given B, both because the 
relative benefit expected is less and because the stigma 
costs of applying are higher. For a given level of y, 
the higher B is then the greater will be the likelihood 
of  the benefits amply compensating for the costs. 
Consequently, there will be an increasing likelihood 
of take-up at B given y and z.
The household characteristics reflected in the z 











6 Agency responsible for managing all social benefits (contributory 
and non-contributory) in Uruguay.
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The National Social Emergency Plan:
institutional aspects, eligibility criteria
and application procedure
Following Amarante, Burdín and Vigorito (2008), 
this section summarizes the main characteristics of 
panes, its institutional and administrative framework 
and most particularly its eligibility requirements and 
the application procedure required of households.
1. overview
The National Social Emergency Plan (panes) in 
Uruguay was created to put into effect a set of social 
policies aimed at very low-income households. The 
target population of  the programme was the first 
quintile of people below the poverty line (8%) and 
included all those living in indigence (4.2%). The plan 
was created by law 17869, enacted in May 2005.
The official panes documentation established 
two basic objectives for the plan:7 first, to provide 
contingent assistance in the form of a cash transfer 
(known as Citizen Income) and subsidies for food 
consumption; and second, to produce longer-term 
effects through the provision of training, education 
and literacy programmes and social and occupational 
participation activities, although these were more 
restricted in scope.
2. Eligibility criteria
To apply to the programme, households had to 
complete a standard form provided by the Ministry 
of Social Development (mides), which included an 
income declaration and a list of household members 
and their respective identity card numbers.
Officials from mides would then visit the 
household to collect detailed information on its 
characteristics. When the programme began in May 
2005, some particularly deprived areas were chosen 
to carry out a census at the same time as registration 
and inspection forms were completed. This procedure 
encompassed 12,000 households and was dubbed 
desembarcos (“landings”). The data were entered at 
mides and transferred to the Social Security Bank, 
where the information in the forms was collated with 
that in the social security records. Article 6 of law 
17869 provides that: “Benefits will be provided to 
households whose income from every source other 
than family allowances and old-age and disability 
benefits in the month of March 2005 does not exceed 
$ 1,300 (one thousand three hundred Uruguayan 
pesos) per person, and which present critical needs 
in their living conditions.”
Out of the pool of households whose monthly 
income, whether declared or as ascertained from Social 
Security Bank records, did not exceed a maximum of 
1,300 pesos per capita, beneficiaries were chosen on 
the basis of a score arrived at by a linear combination 
of the set of household characteristics measured by 
the critical needs index. Those scoring above a certain 
cut-off  point (varying by region) were admitted into 
the programme.8
Some 131,000 households applied for panes and 
about 80,000 of these were accepted.9
7 For further details, see Ministry of Social Development [online] 
www.mides.gub.uy.
8 The methodology used to calculate the critical needs index 
(índice de carencias críticas) is described in Amarante, Arim and 
Vigorito (2006).
9 The number of households approved was about twice as great 
as originally planned.
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VI
information sources and descriptive statistics
The information sources used in this study were 
the 2006 Extended National Household Survey 
(enha) and the 2007 Continuous Household Survey. 
Both are representative of  the national total and 
contain socioeconomic information on households 
and individuals.
Two criteria were used to determine household 
eligibility:
(i) Households in the first quintile below the poverty 
line, as the target population was originally 
defined. This criterion is applicable to urban 
areas only.10
(ii) Households whose critical needs score is above 
the cut-off  point and whose per capita income, 
following the criteria laid down by the relevant 
law, is less than 1,300 pesos. In this case, the 
estimate was carried out for the whole country.
Table A-1 presents the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used. As table 2 shows, the proportion 
of  eligible households that did not apply to the 
programme was somewhere between 17% and 22%, 
depending on the criterion used, or about 9,500 
households. The percentage estimated using the second 
criterion was higher because it included rural areas, 
where take-up of programmes of this type tends to 
be less substantial.
These levels of non-take-up look relatively low when 
compared with information from the oecd countries.11 
However, the estimates available for other countries 
are usually for the percentage of eligible households 
or individuals not receiving the benefits rather than for 
the percentage not applying, as with the present study. 
This means that in determining the non-take-up level 
they include errors made in the administration process 
and in the application of the targeting instrument, 
i.e., the number of eligible households that apply for 
the benefit and are wrongly rejected.
As Amarante and others (2007) point out, using the 
Extended National Household Survey to identify eligible 
households is not without its methodological drawbacks. 
In the first place, there is no information available 
on households prior to programme implementation, 
meaning that income declared in the survey may differ 
from the amount they were receiving at the time of 
the panes application. The same considerations hold 
good for the critical needs score, as household living 
conditions could have changed between the application 
date and the survey date. In the second place, it is also 
possible that income may have been underdeclared to 
varying degrees, both in the survey and at the time the 
benefit was applied for, since households were aware of 
the panes eligibility conditions. Lastly, it is assumed 
that households receiving panes benefits would not 
have changed their working behaviour had they not 
been beneficiaries, so that their income would have 
been equal to what they received without the Citizen 
Income transfer.12
Despite these difficulties, we consider that the 
information available in the 2006 enha does allow 
a reasonable idea to be formed of  the eligibility 
conditions for the programme. The survey also 
distinguishes between enrolled households and 
households that actually receive the benefit, meaning 
that the determinants of the decision to apply can be 
analysed directly. This offers an advantage over other 
studies of  this type where, as already mentioned, 
it is modelled indirectly and the only distinction is 
between those who do and do not receive the benefit. 
In accordance with the typology defined in section 
II, the present study deals with the determinants of 
primary non-take-up, having been able to isolate the 
problems of secondary non-take-up.
10 This is because poverty is calculated only in urban areas, since 
rental value is not included in household income in rural areas and 
incomes are thus not strictly comparable between the two.
11 See Hernanz, Malherbert and Pellizzari (2004) for a systematic 
analysis of these estimates.
12 There is no conclusive evidence about the possible effects of 
panes on working behaviour. Amarante, Burdín and Vigorito 
(2008) evaluated the repercussions of the programme on the labour 
supply (activity and hours worked) using a discontinuous design 
methodology prepared on the basis of  a survey of  beneficiary 
households (treatment group) and households not receiving benefits 
(control group) in a small area of the algorithm cut-off point. The 
authors found no evidence that applying to panes affected working 
behaviour. Borraz and González (2008) did not find any effects on 
working activity either, although they did find some reduction in 
hours worked. These authors did not use a specific survey design 
to evaluate the programme, but applied propensity score matching 
with the household survey.
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Given how important it is to be able to estimate 
the determinants of panes non-take-up for the whole 
country, i.e., including rural areas, the eligibility 
criterion adopted to estimate take-up was the one 
that took account of both the critical needs index 
and the upper income limit.
Table 3 shows the proportion of eligible households 
that did not enrol in panes. Some 22% of those which 
met the eligibility requirements did not apply for 
these benefits; the percentage was significantly lower 
in Montevideo. 
Households with a lower non-take-up rate included 
those already in receipt of a benefit from the Social 
Security Bank (allowances, pensions), those headed by a 
black person,13 those in large cities and those containing 
a larger number of  minors. Rural areas presented 
extremely high non-take-up rates, amounting to 46% 
of eligible households. Likewise, a larger proportion 
of households headed by elderly people did not enrol 
in the programme, except in Montevideo.
In the single-parent households category, panes 
non-enrolment rates were low and in no case exceeded 
10% of eligible households. They were higher in home-
owning and more educated households. Households 
with an unemployed or inactive head had slightly higher 
non-application rates, except in Montevideo.
TABLE 2
Distribution of eligible households by eligibility criteria, 2006
(Percentages)
 Enrolled Unenrolled Total
First quintile below the poverty line 83.1 16.9 100.0
Critical needs score and per capita income below 1,300 pesos 78.4 21.6 100.0
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  the 2006 Extended National Household Survey.
VII
Preliminary findings
Table 4 presents the results of the probit model based 
on the 2006 enha that was used to estimate the 
likelihood of an eligible household applying for Citizen 
Income.14 The benefit was provided to households, so 
the estimates were also carried out at this level.
Following Fuchs (2007), two estimates were 
carried out: one that included the activity status of 
the household head, and one that did not, in view 
of the possibility of  selection biases. Both models 
were estimated for the whole country, Montevideo 
and the interior.
The whole country estimates included dummy 
variables by department to control for possible 
idiosyncratic effects on take-up associated with 
place of residence. Local area variables were used in 
Montevideo for the same purpose. Controls were also 
included for wealth, measured by the availability of 
durable goods (wealth), and for the building materials 
used in the home (makeshiftroof).15
Generally speaking, the variables affect panes 
take-up significantly and with the expected sign, and are 
consistent with the results obtained in other studies.
The ratio between the amount of the benefit and 
the household’s total income (benefit) positively affects 
the likelihood of enrolment. Thus, households where 
the benefit on offer from the programme was large in 
relative terms presented more applications than the rest, 
in line with the findings of other research (Anderson 
and Meyer, 1997; Blundell, Fry and Walker, 1988).
13 Households whose heads perceive themselves as being of 
African descent.
14 Table A-2 shows the model estimates for 2007. By and large, 
the coefficients estimated did not present any significant variation 
over 2006.
15 The number of  durable goods in a household was captured 
by constructing a wealth index in which the two variables were 
added together, using weights obtained by a factor analysis. See 
the appendix for further methodological details.
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TABLE 3
Proportion of households not enrolled in the National Social Emergency Plan
in Uruguay, by characteristics, 2006
(Percentages of eligible households)
 National total Montevideo Rest of  country
Total 21.64 12.74 24.13
Receiving other benefits from the Social Security Bank
 No 28.58 18.37 32.27
 Yes 19.91 10.95 22.25
Head of household is black
 No 23.16 14.13 25.49
 Yes 15.51 8.48 18.11
Locality
 5,000 inhabitants or over 12.95 – 13.05
 Less than 5,000 inhabitants 33.11 – 33.11
 Rural 46.35 – 46.35
Number of minors
 Households without minors 54.23 33.33 54.33
 One minor 23.73 12.07 25.27
 Two minors 20.53 16.14 21.67
 Three minors 19.24 12.69 21.22
 Four minors or more 17.26 11.95 19.49
Household head over 65
 No 19.26 12.83 21.24
 Yes 47.15 6.61 48.55
Single-parent household
 No 24.65 14.33 27.38
 Yes 9.36 7.48 10.00
Owner-occupied household
 No 17.58 12.52 19.49
 Yes 32.11 14.88 33.52
Household head unemployed/inactive
 No 21.00 14.15 23.09
 Yes 22.95 9.20 26.12
Education
 Less than nine years 20.66 11.13 23.38
 Nine years or more 28.92 26.52 29.50
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  the 2006 Extended National Household Survey.
N.B.: Does not include the wealth and roofing material variables, as they lack any particular theoretical interpretation and are used 
merely as control variables in the model. See table A-1 for further details.
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TABLE 4
Probit model for take-up of the National Social Emergency Plan in Uruguay, 2006 
(Marginal effects)
Explanatory variable Whole country Montevideo Interior
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Benefit 0.119 0.12 0.126 0.13 0.124 0.124
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Benefbps 0.111 0.112 0.115 0.117 0.1 0.101
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Below5000 -0.094 -0.093   -0.09 -0.09
 (0.006)*** (0.006)***   (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Rural -0.264 -0.264   -0.262 -0.262
 (0.008)*** (0.008)***   (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Under18 0.04 0.04 0.023 0.022 0.048 0.048
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Over65 -0.126 -0.119 0.046 0.054 -0.119 -0.117
 (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.020)** (0.018)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
Edclimate -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)* (0.001)**
Black 0.014 0.014 0.047 0.048 -0.004 -0.004
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** -0.006 -0.006
Singleparent 0.086 0.088 0.031 0.037 0.106 0.107
 (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Unemp/inact 0.012  0.03  0.004 
 (0.005)**  (0.007)***  -0.006 
Owner -0.058 -0.058 -0.016 -0.012 -0.063 -0.063
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** -0.011 -0.011 (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Wealth -0.103 -0.103 -0.077 -0.077 -0.115 -0.115
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Makeshiftroof  0.066 0.066 0.048 0.046 0.073 0.073
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
No. of  observations 41 974 41 974 8 293 8 293 32 754 32 754
Pseudo R2 0.213 0.2129 0.1562 0.154 0.2294 0.2294
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  the 2006 Extended National Household Survey.
N.B.: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Explanatory variables: Benefit = ratio between benefit amount and total household income; Benefbps = other Social Security Bank 
benefits; Below5000 = small urban localities; Rural = rural areas; Under18 = number of  under-18s; Over65 = household head over 65; 
Edclimate = household education level; Black = household with black head; Singleparent = single-parent household; Unemp/inact = 
unemployed or inactive household head; Owner = owner-occupied household; Wealth = availability of  durable goods; Makeshiftroof 
= building materials used in the home. 
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Again, households already in receipt of some type 
of benefit from the Social Security Bank (benefbps) 
were more likely to apply, supporting the idea that 
previous experience with similar application procedures 
reduced the costs of processing panes information.
Households living in small urban areas16 
(below5000), and most particularly those living in rural 
areas (rural), were less likely to enrol than those in 
large cities. In small towns, the impossibility of going 
unobserved may heighten the stigma usually associated 
with applications to means-tested programmes. In 
rural localities, information access difficulties and 
higher travel costs make it more expensive to apply 
for benefits. The effects encountered were similar to 
the findings of the studies reviewed.
Meanwhile, the age of  the household head 
was observed to have a negative effect on take-up, 
particularly when it was over 65 (over65). This could 
indicate that social and psychological costs are higher 
in the more elderly population, and that the difficulty 
of processing the necessary information is greater. 
This finding was reversed in Montevideo, where the 
coefficient was positive. This may have been due to 
mitigation of the stigma effect in this age group in a 
situation of more impersonal social interactions like 
that prevailing in the country’s capital.
Households headed by a black person (black) were 
more likely to enrol in panes. This effect was observed 
in the country as a whole and Montevideo, being less 
noticeable in the estimate for the country’s interior.17 
The relatively high proportion of applicants from this 
ethnic group appears to be a result of information 
spreading through networks of  personal contacts, 
reducing the stigma effect and encouraging take-up 
of the programme.
Single-parent households (singleparent) and 
households containing under-18s (under18) were 
more likely to apply for the benefit. In the first case, 
the fact of there being just one potential breadwinner 
probably reduces employment expectations and 
encourages programme take-up. In the second, the 
larger number of minors in the household probably 
increases the chances of success in the application 
process. Stigmatizing mechanisms, meanwhile, do 
not seem to affect households of this type much by 
comparison with those where the benefit is paid to 
adults capable of generating income for themselves. 
The results obtained for different programmes and 
countries by Blank and Ruggles (1996), Riphahn (2001) 
and Kayser and Frick (2001) were similar.18
On the other hand, take-up of  the benefit is 
inversely related to the level of  education in the 
household (edclimate), although the scale of  the 
effect is not significant. A similar result was obtained 
by Riphahn (2001) in Germany. It is possible that 
the sign may be due to the fact that households with 
more educational capital have greater expectations 
of improving their financial situation in future. The 
negative effect on take-up produced by home ownership 
(owner) might be interpreted in the same way.
Again, for a household to have an unemployed 
or inactive head (unemp/inact) increases the likelihood 
of enrolment. The findings of Fuchs (2007) suggest 
that the lack of significant variation in the coefficients 
when the variable identifying the employment and 
activity status of the household head is excluded or 
included indicates that the variables selected are not 
highly endogenous to this characteristic.
16 Urban centres with less than 5,000 inhabitants.
17 This could be because there are more people of African descent 
in Montevideo.
18 In this last case, the authors did not find significant effects arising 
from single-parent household status.
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This document has addressed the issue of non-take-
up of panes by households meeting the eligibility 
requirements of the programme.
On the basis of  the 2006 Extended National 
Household Survey, it was estimated that some 22% 
of potentially eligible households had not applied to 
enter the programme. Striking though this figure may 
be, it is not particularly high when compared to data 
from the oecd countries. In any event, the proportion 
was considerably higher in urban communities of less 
than 5,000 inhabitants (33%) and most particularly in 
rural areas (46%).
According to the probit model estimates, take-up 
was positively affected by the size of the transfer in 
relation to household income. Households containing 
more under-18s, receiving other benefits from the 
Social Security Bank or headed by a black person or 
single parent were also more likely to apply to panes. 
Conversely, rural households were significantly less 
likely to enrol, as were households headed by over-
65s. Thus, the evidence largely appears to confirm the 
determinants discussed in the theoretical literature 
(monetary factors, information costs, social and 
psychological costs). The findings are also consistent 
with those of similar studies in oecd countries. 
Since this was a preliminary survey, we should 
draw attention to some limitations of  the present 
article and indicate some future lines of inquiry. First, 
lack of information meant that it was not possible 
to analyse the effect of the “landings” on take-up. 
This information should be examined as and when it 
becomes available, as it was a design element clearly 
oriented towards reducing non-take-up rates.
Second, the solidity of  the findings needs to 
be analysed using other estimation methods that 
take more systematic account of possible selection 
biases. This is particularly important when it comes 
to analysing the effect of the economic activity status 
of the household head. It is possible that some people 
may be changing their working behaviour to meet the 
income eligibility requirements laid down by means-
tested social programmes. This could produce a bias 
in the estimates and result in overestimation of the 
effects of unemployment as a determinant of social 
programme participation. It should be pointed out, 
however, that other studies which have introduced 
corrections of this type have not found any significant 
differences (Fuchs, 2007).
Third, it would be particularly helpful if the effects 
of social interactions on the decision to apply to panes 
were incorporated systematically into the model. The 
sign encountered for many of the variables used could be 
reflecting some consequences of this kind, one example 
being the larger number of applications presented by 
black household heads. Nonetheless, this preliminary 
approach did not allow us to ascertain with any accuracy 
how social interactions might be affecting household 
take-up. In particular, it was impossible to measure 
the specific weight of the information effect and the 
stigma effect. The distinction is not unimportant from 
the point of view of policy implications (Cohen-Cole 
and Zanella, 2008). Considering social interactions 
in a decision-making model like the one used in the 
present study gives rise to complexities that need to be 
addressed in future stages of this research (Manski, 
1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001).
Lastly, it would be desirable for take-up decisions to 
be internalized to a greater degree in prior evaluations 
of social programmes in Uruguay. Studies of this type 
generally assume that policies are perfectly targeted, 
and this can result in a faulty appreciation of their 
distributive and fiscal effects. This seems to be very 
much the case, for example, with the application of 
the new family allowance system in Uruguay.
In any event, the foregoing analysis raises some 
interesting social policy implications. As already 
mentioned, concern about proper targeting of social 
programmes has focused too much on denying benefits 
to people who exceed predetermined income and 
wealth limits. Less attention has been paid, however, 
to the fact that many programmes do not reach the 
whole of their target population, partly because there 
is a segment of potential beneficiaries who never even 
apply for the benefits. In this respect they could be at 
a disadvantage to more universal schemes, and this 
should be set against the higher fiscal costs associated 
with the latter.
Meanwhile, as Van Oorschot (1991) points 
out, it is crucial to analyse the structure, design and 
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methods used to publicize them and make known the 
requirements and procedures for obtaining their benefits. 
Better information systems, simplified application 
procedures and careful choice of  the mechanisms 
determining programme “launch” are examples of 
concrete measures that could be applied (Fuchs, 2007). 
The characteristics of eligible households that do not 
apply for benefits offer pointers to such measures.
AppEndix
Definition of the variables used in the model19
Benefit Ratio between the benefit amount and total household income.
Benefbps Binary variable indicating whether the household receives other benefits from the Social Security Bank.
Below5000 Binary variable indicating whether the household is in an urban area of  less than 5,000 inhabitants (omitted). 
Urban Binary variable indicating whether the household is in an urban area of  5,000 inhabitants or more.
Rural Binary variable indicating whether the household is in a rural area.
Over65 Binary variable indicating whether the household head is over 65.
Black Binary variable indicating whether the household head considers himself  or herself  to be of  African descent.
Singleparent Binary variable indicating whether the household comprises a single head plus children.
Under18 Number of  under-18s in the household.
Edclimate Average years of  formal education completed by the adults in the household.20
Owner Binary variable indicating whether the household owns its own home.
Unemp/inact Binary variable indicating whether the household head is unemployed or inactive.
Wealth Variable constructed using a factor analysis that provides a proxy for household wealth.
Makeshiftroof  Binary variable indicating whether the dwelling roof  is made of  mainly lightweight materials, mud and rushes 
or waste products, or there is no ceiling.
19 Use was made of binary variables for the 19 departments in the 
case of the whole country estimates and for local districts in the 
case of Montevideo.
20 In households with no members over 18, the years of education 
of the household head are taken.
Methodology of the composite wealth index
To obtain a proxy for the wealth of households in 
the whole country, we constructed a wealth index 
based on the availability of certain durable goods. 
The coefficients of  this index were obtained using 
the principal components method.
Weights
Water heater 0.6665
Cable television connection 0.5392
Fixed-line telephone 0.6367





Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  the 2006 
Extended National Household Survey.
TABLE A-1
Descriptive statistics, 2006
 Total population Eligible population
 Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Benefit 0.180 0.246 0.458 0.496
Benefbps 0.602 0.490 0.800 0.400
Black 0.075 0.264 0.198 0.399
Montevideo 0.869 0.337 0.656 0.475
Urban 0.065 0.247 0.211 0.408
Rural 0.066 0.247 0.133 0.340
Under18 0.838 1.228 2.932 1.911
Over65 0.276 0.447 0.085 0.279
Edclimate 8.710 3.782 6.029 2.060
Singleparent 0.116 0.321 0.197 0.398
Unemp/inact 0.354 0.478 0.331 0.470
Owner 0.514 0.500 0.279 0.449
Wealth 2.432 1.574 0.476 0.712
Makeshiftroof  0.111 0.314 0.478 0.500
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  the 2006 
Extended National Household Survey.
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TABLE A-2 
Probit model of National Social Emergency Plan take-up, 2007
(Marginal effects)
Explanatory variable Country total Montevideo Interior
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Benefit 0.019 0.021 0.165 0.168 0.013 0.015
 (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Benefbps 0.1 0.102 0.13 0.128 0.085 0.09
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)***
Urban -0.038 -0.042    
 (0.011)*** (0.011)***    
Rural -0.177 -0.186   -0.106 -0.106
 (0.026)*** (0.027)***   (0.009)*** (0.009)***
Under18 0.023 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.022 0.024
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Over65 -0.152 -0.121 -0.082 -0.065 -0.176 -0.142
 (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.029)*** (0.027)** (0.019)*** (0.017)***
Edclimate -0.01 -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** -0.002 -0.002 (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Black 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.022 0.023
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** -0.008 (0.008)* (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Singleparent 0.042 0.049 0.098 0.1 0.025 0.033
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Unemp/inact 0.038  0.018  0.042 
 (0.003)***  (0.008)**  (0.004)*** 
Owner -0.01 -0.007 0.028 0.032 -0.017 -0.013
 (0.003)*** (0.003)* (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Wealth -0.037 -0.039 -0.004 -0.003 -0.04 -0.044
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** -0.005 -0.005 (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Makeshiftroof  0.012 0.011 0.055 0.054 0 -0.001
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** -0.004 -0.004
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  the 2007 Continuous Household Survey.
N.B.: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Explanatory variables: Benefit = ratio between benefit amount and total household income; Benefbps = other Social Security Bank 
benefits; Urban = urban areas; Rural = rural areas; Under18 = number of  under-18s; Over65 = household head over 65; Edclimate = 
household education level; Black = household with black head; Singleparent = single-parent household; Unemp/inact = unemployed 
or inactive household head; Owner = owner-occupied household; Wealth = availability of  durable goods; Makeshiftroof = building 
materials used in the home.
(Original: Spanish)
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